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Introduction
Background information
SARS-CoV-2 or Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Corona 
virus 2 is a respiratory virus which is highly contagious and suspected 
to originate from a food market in Wuhan, China. Originally SARS-
CoV-2 was diagnosed as Pneumonia cases in 2019 and is transferred 
to humans through interspecies transmission.1,2 SARS-CoV-2 is 
a positive, single-stranded RNA virus from the coronaviridae 
family and belong to the Nidovirales, which are known for causing 
respiratory and gastrointestinal tract infections, such as the common 
cold, bronchitis, and Pneumonia.3–5 Other common corona viruses 
include SARS and MERS (Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome) 
which have cause epidemics in 2003 and 2012 respectively.5,6 
Corona viruses were named after their structure as their spike 
projections from the virus membranes resembles a crown structure; 
in Latin, corona meaning crown.4 These spike projections are (spiked) 
glycol proteins, or carbohydrate-protein complexes, found on the outer 
surface of the viral envelope. The inside of the envelope contains the 
nucleo capsid which is comprised of nucleic acid, in this case RNA, 
and capsids which encloses the nucleic acid.3,7,8 The structure of a 
virus is essential to understand how it enters and replicates in host 
cells. In this instance, the spiked glycol proteins bind to a cellular 
receptor called ACE2 in hosts, which initiates the release of viral 
RNA to undergo translation and replication into small proteins. These 
proteins act as capsids, or a shell, when viral RNA is added at the 
endoplasmic reticulum and the Golgi complex forming virions, a 
complete form of the virus, which are released out of cells in vesicles 
using exocytosis.7 Replication can occur quickly as there are only a 
few steps in virus replication, which is more rapid in corona viruses as 
the positive RNA strand acts like messenger RNA and can be translated 
directly.8 Although SARS-CoV-2 is genetically similar to SARS-CoV-
1,SARS-CoV-2 has a higher reproductive rate. This is caused by slight 
structural differences in SARS-CoV-2 virus which allows for strong 
binding to the ACE2 receptor and are more efficient in evading host 
cells.9 Another cause of increased replication is that SARS-CoV-2 has 
an affinity to the upper respiratory tract, infecting and controlling the 
airways more easily.9 These factors affect the transmission of the virus 
and is a main reason SARS-CoV-2 has caused a pandemic. China 
recognised that this outbreak was in Wuhan, and shared information 
with the World Health Organisation (WHO) in January 2020, a 
common method of notification for international outbreaks.10,11 After 
this point active surveillance was required to monitor the transmission 
of this disease. Since the first case was identified in December 2019, 
the pandemic was named COVID-19. 
As a new corona virus, vaccinations were not available until 
the end of 2020. Therefore, the safest way of protecting the public 
was heavily based on contact tracing systems to monitor and track 
the spread of disease. The purpose of these monitoring systems is 
to reduce the spread of the disease and ensure that mortality caused 
by the disease is low. An example of this is the National Notifiable 
Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS) in the US, which is a 
programme that monitors public health and control of approximately 
120 diseases from infectious zika virus to food borne outbreaks such 
as E.coli and non-infectious conditions like lead poisoning. The 
surveillance system is use for collating, sharing and analysing data 
including policies, laws, information systems, and resources at local, 
state, territorial and national level.12 This system is being used by 
epidemiologists conducting public health surveillance to calculate key 
factors such as incidence (the number of new cases within a specific 
time period), prevalence (number of cases at one point in time), 
hospitalisation and deaths.13 
Monitoring the transmission of diseases is common and have 
been utilised in other epidemics. A blog published by Public Health 
England (PHE) discusses using contact tracing for MERS, which 
caused an epidemic in Middle Eastern countries in 2012.14 For 
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Abstract
The investigation of the UK Test and Trace system illustrated that policies enforced were 
not sufficient to prevent the spread of SARS-CoV-2 in the UK. Some of the shortcomings 
included the app, the introduction to curfews and policies in hospitality sector, the methods 
of reporting COVID related deaths, restriction of movements across the border and 
adherence from the public. Other countries such as Japan and New Zealand implemented 
effective contact tracing systems due to the promotion of contact tracing and adherence to 
the policies created. These countries also had more preventive measures in place such as 
reducing attendees at school and enforcing the use of contact tracing for all industries. The 
Netherlands could also use more preventative measure to reduce cases, since there was a 
similar number of cases to the UK per 1 million in the population, however the mortality 
rate in the UK is double that of the Netherlands. To determine why, more research into 
pre-existing health conditions and obesity would need to be conducted to provide evidence 
into whether these factors effect mortality rates in SARS-CoV-2 cases. Research into other 
countries contact tracing systems can provide more possibilities for improvement.
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England, the PHE is responsible for surveillance of diseases, which is 
based on a surveillance strategy created in 2013 outlining the response 
to outbreaks, monitoring prevalence and incidence of infectious 
diseases, and prioritising the allocation of resources.15 To monitor 
the number of cases of SARS-CoV-2 in the UK, the PHE helped 
the release of the NHS Test and Trace system, to identify cases and 
reduce the transmission of the disease to minimise mortality.16 This 
is monitored by the reproductive rate (R rate) which determines how 
infectious a particular disease is at one point in time.16 
Aims and objectives
The purpose of this investigation is to determine whether the UK’s 
Test and Trace system and response to the COVID-19 pandemic 
was efficient; this will be based on a comparison to other countries 
across the world and how effective their systems were. To explore this 
concept, data from February 2020 to February 2021 will be examined 
and analyzed to identify any trends present and correlate the data to 
each country’s response to reach a conclusion on whether the UK’s 
system was appropriate. Other factors, such as the population, border 
control and public reactions will be considered when concluding the 
efficiency of contact tracing systems. 
Discussion
Test and trace system in the UK
At the beginning of April 2020, just after a national lockdown had 
been announced across the UK, the Department of Health and Social 
Care published its plan to test for SARS-CoV-2, describing how the 
testing will be scaled accordingly. In this document, the plan describes 
a Five Pillar System forming the base of the Test and Trace system in 
the UK; pillar one focuses on scaling up NHS swabbing for those with 
medical need and “where possible” key workers i.e., those in a critical 
role such as doctors, and nurses. The second pillar concentrates on 
mass testing for all key workers including individuals working in 
social care. The third pillar was mass antibody testing of the public 
to determine whether people obtain immunity from the virus after 
infection. Fourthly, this pillar looked at surveillance testing to further 
research into the novel virus and develop new treatments and testing. 
Finally, the fifth pillar was to form a mass testing facility in aid to lead 
a movement in the diagnostics national effort.17 Some aims provided 
to facilitate the Five pillar system include increasing the number of 
swab testing for the first pillar. During March 2020, the Department 
of Health and Social Care stated that they were performing 10,000 
tests a day and by April 2020 they wanted to increase to 25,000 tests 
per day. Their aims for pillar two was to network with companies such 
as Amazon, Boots, and universities to provide capacity for testing 
sites and provide mass swab testing.18,19 The third pillar focused on 
antibody testing for immunity using a rapid system for detection to 
determine whether “Life can return as normal”. Facilitating the fourth 
pillar involved surveys from PHE using high accuracy antibody tests. 
Pillar five involved large scale companies providing ventilators and 
pharmaceutical companies collaborating to formulate a diagnostic 
industry.18,19 
To effectuate the Five Pillar System, lighthouse laboratories were 
created in Milton Keynes, Glasgow, and Alderley Park, consisting of 
qualified volunteers from industry and academia areas.20 Lighthouse 
laboratories are facilities dedicated to corona virus testing at high 
throughputs as part of the National Testing Programme.20 All 
lighthouse laboratories are managed through the Department of 
Health and Social Care and are each reviewed by experts with their 
own virology adviser.21 The first laboratories were set up in Milton 
Keynes and Alderley Park in Cheshire.22 Other methods of increasing 
capacity have been partnering laboratories which perform a high 
volume of corona virus testing alongside other services. A partnership 
agreement with public, private, and academic sectors were utilised to 
increase the capacity.21 
A factor of concern with the use of these laboratories is the quality 
assurance and whether protocols are being followed according to the 
appropriate accreditation. According to the government website, the 
lighthouse laboratories were set up by scientific experts with decades 
of experience, however, does not provide any information of how 
suitable protocols have been placed or how quality standards are met.21 
To further this concern, an online news article implies that a panorama 
journalist from the BBC was working as a laboratory technician in one 
of the lighthouse laboratories. They reported that ISO standards were 
not being followed and staff were under pressure, had malfunctioning 
equipment and tests discarded wrongly.23 The credibility of this source 
is low, as there is no apparent author, therefore the accusation of poor 
laboratory practice is nothing more than an assumption. Nevertheless, 
there is no apparent evidence to prove improper or proper laboratory 
standards which introduces doubt into the public’s trust in the national 
health services and the Government. 
The system in the UK has been set up to work collaboratively with 
Test and Trace apps, there are different apps depending on which part 
of the UK an individual lives; for England and Wales the NHS app is 
used, in Scotland an app called Scotland protect Scot is utilised and 
finally Northern Ireland uses COVID NI app.24 The app is used to 
help contact people who may have been in contact with someone who 
tested positive for SARS-CoV-2, known as contact tracing, however 
this relies on individuals to report their symptoms to obtain a test. This 
is achieved by scanning QR codes for buildings and stores requiring 
internet access and Bluetooth to determine if an individual has 
been within 2 meters of a person testing positive for longer than 15 
minutes. The individual would then be notified to be tested, without 
sharing confidential information such as the name of the person who 
was confirmed as a positive case.25 
An individual showing symptoms, or advised to take a test, can 
obtain a test via multiple routes. Tests can be ordered online using the 
NHS website or calling 119 if they do not have access to the internet. 
Walk in or drive through corona virus testing site are available by 
booking an appointment. Since April 2021, everyone can access 
free lateral flow tests by ordering a testing kit online through the 
government or NHS website which do not require laboratory testing. 
Once an individual has access to a test, their swabs are sent to a 
laboratory, one part of the National Laboratory Network, for analysis. 
Once the results are obtained, the NHS contacts the individual with 
the results; if positive the individual should isolate for 14 days, which 
was decreased to 10 days in December 2020, and follow instructions 
provided on the app so that others can be tested. If not followed, then 
an individual can receive a £1000 fine.16 To investigate how effective 
the UK contact tracing system is, the advantages and disadvantages 
of the NHS Test and Trace app is shown in Table 1. Other issues had 
occurred when the app was publicized as there were rumors that the 
app violated data protection laws and unknowingly changed phone 
settings, leaving the public feeling as if they lost their right for privacy 
in their life.26 This resulted in some of the public being unwilling to 
use or download the app, which then lowers the efficiency of the app 
and the Test and Trace system. This leads into investigating adherence 
from the public and the effect on the Test and Trace system. 
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Table 1 Table demonstrating advantages and disadvantages to the NHS Test and Trace app
Benefits to the NHS test and trace app Negatives to the NHS test and trace app
Easy to access and scan Some individuals do not have access to a smart phone 
Reduces use of paper which can transmit virus Is dependent on Bluetooth and Internet access
Rapid notification of contact between individuals Notifications do not always work or can be turned off
If phone is turned off or runs out of battery the app will not work
Adherence to the test and trace system UK
An article by Smith and others stated in October 2020 that three 
quarters of individuals with symptoms in their household reported 
of leaving their home within the last 24 hours when participating 
in this survey.24 This article also noted that men were more likely to 
not adhere to rules and leave their household when themselves or a 
member had symptoms of corona virus, this refers to similar trend 
in the 2009/2010 UK influenza pandemic. They suggested a targeted 
campaign aim at men could have increased adherence to lockdown 
rules. Another significant finding is that adherence to self-isolation is 
associated with fear of becoming infected, therefore when the number 
of cases decline, adherence is lower as the public are less afraid. This 
research concluded that self-adherence and self-isolation was poor 
at the time of research and suggested effective use of a volunteering 
system to provide essentials to those shielding and isolating would 
increase adherence in a pragmatic way.27 
In another study, Wright and others suggested that people with 
higher awareness of COVID-19 i.e., higher levels of knowledge in 
relation to COVID-19, is associated with higher adherence based on 
research performed at UCL.28 Wright and others also investigated 
other factors such as confidence in institution; it was implied that 
individuals with high confidence in the government and the health 
services had a higher compliance to the laws relating to COVID-19. 
However, this research included people volunteering as part as a 
community group in low adherence even though Smith and others 
suggested that these volunteers would help increase compliance to 
the rules.27,28 
Both articles discuss that there are limitations in their research for 
example Wright and others mention that their data can be subjected 
to selective bias as they specifically used data from a study focused 
on COVID-19 and the selection of samples are not representative of 
the general population.28 Smith and others implied that their research 
may not accurately represent the general population and included 
other limitations, they did not ask whether individuals encountered 
another individual from a different household, as non-adherence is 
not the only factor to increase transmission of the virus.27 Both studies 
suggested that adherence varies but can be improved, for example 
increasing the trust in the ability of the Government in handling the 
pandemic and focusing on establishing volunteer systems. This allows 
isolated individuals access to essential items without leaving their 
household and increasing risk of infection.27,28 
Case data on Civid-19 pandemic
To determine whether contact tracing systems were effective, 
data obtained by the World Health Organisation was collected and 
analysed to produce the figures below; these focus on the UK, the 
Netherlands, Japan, and New Zealand. This involved observing 
differences between the cumulative total of SARS-CoV-2 cases, the 
cumulative total of SARS-CoV-2 deaths and factoring population on 
the cumulative totals. 
From observing the graph, there is a general trend of increasing 
numbers between November 2020 and February 2021.The total 
number of cases in the UK is constantly above any other country and 
the difference increases especially towards the end of February 2021 
as the UK has four times the number of cumulative cases compared 
to the Netherlands and Japan. When comparing all the countries 
investigated, New Zealand has the minimal number of cases and 
does not increase during the November 2020 to February 2021 period 
unlike all the other countries. Generally, all countries apart from 
New Zealand, have had an increase in case numbers of SARS-CoV-2 
between November 2020 and February 2021. 
Possible factors contributing to the increase of SARS-
CoV-2 transmission
One possible causation is easing of lockdown rules and 
low adherence of the public. Poole and others investigated the 
transmission of Rhinovirus during 2019 and 2020 to estimate the trend 
of SARS-CoV-2 cases during winter; from this research Poole and 
others determined some significant findings. The percent proportion 
of positive tests is generally higher in 2020 than 2019.33 Secondly, 
in both years, transmission increased when schools reopened and 
when lockdown began to ease.33 This indicates that transmission is 
prominent when schools reopen therefore an increase SARS-CoV-2 
transmission is likely to happen when schools reopen. In the UK, 
schools reopened in September 2020 and only closed during the 
UK’s third lockdown announced on January 4th, 2021. During this 
time, UK citizens would traditionally celebrate Christmas which has 
a focus on meeting family and friends, and exchanging gifts, allowed 
by the government, which would drastically increase transmission of 
SARS-CoV-2. These factors are likely to contribute to the increase of 
cumulative cases during the winter and spring seasons in the UK. To 
identify if schools reopening was a general cause or just specific to the 
UK, the other countries’ tactics were investigated.
In the Netherlands, pupils returned to schools in June 2020 which 
was before UK students returned to school.34 A Dutch head teacher 
explains that students under the age of 12 could mingle freely but 
socially distance themselves from adults. Other conditions include 
parents waiting at the fence at the beginning and end of school. Van 
Druijten states that is this an issue when there’s hundreds of parents 
at the fence waiting for their children.34 Van Druijten also discusses 
promotion of frequent hand washing and designated areas for the 
children to work or for younger children to play in and restricts 
movement from these areas.34 This extract from Van Druijten is not 
representative of all the schools in The Netherlands. A different 
newspaper article mentions how each district had different policies 
in place for when schools reopened, which is similar to the conditions 
UK schools were given.35 The UK were given basic guidelines from 
the Government, such as students in year 7 and above (aged 12 and 
over) must wear a face covering unless exempt for medical reasons,36 
however guidelines would vary depending on size and population 
of the school and the staff available. For example, according to the 
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Government guidance, schools are encouraged to separate toilet 
blocks if possible.37 The similarity in monitoring and reducing 
transmission in schools could be a cause for increased cases in both 
the UK and the Netherlands. 
Japanese students returned to school in May 2020. Schools 
considered conditions such as decreasing overcrowding and 
reducing the number of school hours which was achieved by letting 
students attend either once or twice a week.38 However, similar to 
The Netherlands, different areas applied different policies in school 
and some schools returned in June 2020 instead.38 These policies 
were set by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science 
and Technology – Japan (MEXT) which set out to provide costs for 
disinfectants, thermometers and also funding for classroom equipment. 
Furthermore, MEXT also state in this report the number of infections 
and the source of transmission; between June 1st, 2020 and June 31st, 
2020, 242 out of 12 million students tested positive for corona virus. 
Out of the 242 cases, 57% was caused by household transmission and 
only 5% of cases were caused by in-school transmission.39 The report 
by Wada and others on school students aged 6-12 and 13-15 on the 
transmission of SARS-CoV-2 during the 1st to 31st June 2020, also 
supports the MEXT findings.40 In the UK, it is not known where the 
transmission source is from or where most of transmissions occur 
as the data is not available to the public. This could be interpreted 
as a lack of transparency from the Government or a lack in efficient 
monitoring of the disease. If this were implemented, the UK could 
determine if schools cause increased transmission. 
New Zealand schools started to reopen in April and May 2020 
according to guidance from the alert level system. At level 4, all 
schools are working remotely as lockdown is in place, at level 3 
school years 1-10 and early childhood centers can return at limited 
capacity and other students must use distance learning.42 At level 2 all 
schools are open and accessible for all with specific safety measures 
in place, for example schools will close for cleaning and contact 
tracing if there is a confirmed case when at school. Some other safety 
measures include using a contact tracing system in all schools which 
was implemented in level 3, providing distance learning to those who 
are vulnerable and are shielding and requesting that ill individuals 
remain at home. For level 1 similarly to level 2 all schools are open 
and operate safely.42 In the UK there was no contact tracing systems 
in place and schools did not close for cleaning when there were cases 
of SARS-CoV-2, which clearly shows lack of efficiently monitoring 
the outbreak and preventing cases. 
Another consideration to the increase of cases in the UK is the 
introduction of curfews in September 2020 by the Government to 
the hospitality sector. Pubs, bars, and restaurants were to close at 
10pm in efforts to reduce the amount of time the public spent in these 
buildings to lower the likelihood of transmission as cases had begun 
to rise.43,44 This new enforcement brought new issues to contend with 
as in the beginning, people would all leave the pub, bar or restaurant 
simultaneously then in some cases continue drinking in one household. 
People often started drinking earlier and therefore still spent the same 
amount of time in one particular building with people outside their 
household.45,46 This is a possible causation to the increase of cases, 
as there was a greater opportunity for transmission of SARS-CoV-2, 
due to the crowding and prolonged periods in the hospitality setting. 
During September 2020, New Zealand had their bars open for 
3 months with no or very minimal cases of coronavirus.47,29 Safety 
measures in hospitality settings in New Zealand include using the 
contact tracing app or similar, remain seated where possible, remain 
1 meter apart from other groups and maintain one server for the 
duration. Japan’s bars and restaurants also began to reopen in May, 
however there were some concerns about the number of cases and 
deaths as some individuals thought it was too early to reopen.48 Bars 
and restaurants can remain open till 8pm depending on the prefecture 
and each prefecture’s cases.49 In the Netherlands bars and restaurants 
reopened in June, allowing 30 people indoors and an unlimited 
number of people outside regarding that they remain 1.5 meters apart 
from other groups.50 In October, the Netherlands returned to a partial 
lockdown which meant that the hospitality sector had to reclose.51 
Overall, the other countries did not have issues with curfews and 
generally were allowed more freedom in relation to using hospitality 
sector. 
One factor that could cause general increase of numbers is that 
influenza, a similar virus to SARS-CoV-2, is seasonal and cases 
increase in winter periods. There is currently very little evidence on 
the effect of influenza on SARS-CoV-2 cases but would be an area of 
consideration to investigate when the data is available.
Data of COVID-19 mortalities
The death total from all the countries except the UK remain 
relatively low whereas the UK death total reaches 20,000 between 
April 2020 and May 2020. For both Japan and The Netherlands 
there is a general increase from April 2020 to February 2021, but the 
cumulative number of mortalities remain under 20,000 whereas the 
total cumulative death number for New Zealand is much lower. The 
UK’s cumulative death number is almost five times higher than the 
Netherlands’ and Japan’s cumulative mortalities. Some factors not 
considered in Figures 2 & 3 is population size and density. These 
factors are shown in Table 2.
Figure 1 Annotated structure of SARS-CoV-2, demonstrating significant characteristics such as the Envelope, the membrane glycol proteins and nucleo capsid 
protein.7 
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Figure 2 Graph demonstrating the cumulative number of SARS-CoV-2 cases, comparing the UK, the Netherlands, Japan, and New Zealand .29–32
Figure 3 A graph demonstrating the total cumulative mortalities from SARS-CoV-2 infection in the UK, The Netherlands, Japan, and New Zealand.29–32 
Table 2 Population and SARS-CoV-2 cases with appropriate representation
Country Population size (million)
Population density 
(person/km2)
Cases per 1 
million people 
(population)
Deaths per 1 
million people 
(population)
UK 67 (52) 281 (52) 59,284 1,699
The Netherlands 17 (53) 508 (53) 59,375 846
Japan 126 (54) 347 (54) 3,239 52
New Zealand 4 (55) 18 (55) 492 6
Data used from graph and only contains cumulative numbers up to February 2021
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Some conclusions can be drawn from this table; Japan has the 
highest population and second highest population density but second 
lowest in cases and deaths from SARS-CoV-2 per 1 million people. 
The Netherlands, with the third highest population, had the highest 
population density and highest SARS-CoV-2 cases per 1 million, 
however the deaths are half those of the UK per 1 million of the 
population. New Zealand is likely to have benefited from a small 
population and population density but still have a small number of 
cases per 1 million people and mortalities per 1 million people. Both 
the UK and The Netherlands have a similar number of SARS-CoV-2 
cases per 1 million people although the Netherlands mortality cases 
are half of the UK’s. To determine why the death rate is so much 
higher in the UK in comparison to the other countries, other factors 
were considered. 
Factors effecting the death rate from SARS-CoV-2
One factor adding to the increased mortality is method of reporting 
deaths in the UK. It is assumed that reporting SARS-CoV-2 deaths 
is simple, however this does not consider other long-term illness or 
life changing traumas. For example, if a cancer patient was diagnosed 
with SARS-CoV-2 no matter the time period when the patient died, 
the cause of death would be classified as SARS-CoV-2.56 The World 
Health Organisation (WHO) stated that COVID-19 deaths are defined 
as so for surveillance purposes from a clinically compatible illness 
unless there is a clear alterative cause of death such as trauma.57 
Towards the beginning of the pandemic, the UK was reporting all 
deaths with a positive test of SARS-CoV-2 as COVID-19 related 
death based on the criteria of a clinical assessment provided from 
WHO.56 Although Newton suggested that this method is robust, it 
does not take into consideration deaths from other causes as specified 
earlier or alternatively individuals that died before being confirmed as 
a positive case.56 
To increase the complexity of this issue, Scotland has a different 
method of classifying SARS-CoV-2 deaths; if a death occurs after 
28 days of a positive test, then the death is not classified as SARS-
CoV-2 death.56 In April 2020, the method of classifying COVID-19 
deaths changed allowing individuals’ deaths to be classified as 
SARS-CoV-2 death without a positive test and classifying deaths 
as SARS-CoV-2 after 60 days of a positive test.56,58 This introduces 
new issues into the complex death classification system as now 
there is no need for evidence to classify a SARS-CoV-2 death; it is 
possible that individuals could be classed by symptoms present which 
is problematic as it shares symptoms with other respiratory viruses 
such as influenza. There is also a possibility that individuals who are 
hospitalised for other reasons came into contact with the virus and 
tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 and therefore no definite cause of 
death as either factor could cause death. 
Other possible considerations are the cuts to the NHS and social 
cares sections and possible health conditions including diabetes and 
obesity.59,60 There is very limited evidence to prove this affected the 
death toll, but the UK Government have introduced campaigns to 
reduce population obesity and the pressure placed on the NHS was 
present prior to the pandemic which are important to consider when 
reflecting on SARS-CoV-2 deaths.59,60 The number of people who 
have pre-existing respiratory conditions such as Chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease (COPD) and asthma could affect the death rate if 
higher percentage of the population suffer from these conditions. 
Other countries contact tracing systems
In New Zealand, the Government introduced the Alert system on 
the 21st of March 2020 which consists of four levels, four being the 
highest level and one being the lowest. Prior to this, the New Zealand 
government banned gatherings over 100 people on the 19th of March 
2020 as well as closing the borders on the same day. If any changes 
to the alert system occurred, they would be implemented within 24 
hours. Some precautions include contact tracing for all indoor public 
buildings such as restaurants and schools.47,42,61 The public can decide 
which tracing app or method they prefer if they participate in contact 
tracing.61 
All these decisions are based of a surveillance strategy using five 
objectives; the first objective was to identify all cases for public health 
management from which the government wanted to find methods to 
detect cases early.62 The second objective was to evaluate the response 
from this considering all the perspectives such as the capacity of the 
health system, is contact tracing is effective, how effective public 
health measurements are at the border and the degree of undetected 
infection.62 The third objective considered researching into the virus to 
learn more about disease risk and patterns such as identifying groups 
who are most at risk. The fourth objective was to monitor the disease 
to ensure equity in relation to testing, border control and public health 
management.62 The final objective was to ensure the public confidence 
and participation in their response to the pandemic by determining 
what level of accept and adherence is appropriate for the public.62 
With these at the core of the government decisions, New Zealand was 
able to achieve a high compliance rate to COVID-19 related laws.63 
One effective method of controlling the spread in Japan was the 
accessibility of diagnostic tests to detect SARS-CoV-2 cases. The 
government has offered PCR testing, Antigen testing, and Antibody 
testing to the public explaining the guidelines for each test and where 
they can be obtained.64 Since March 2020, the government have stated 
that PCR tests will be covered by medical insurance allowing private 
institutes to use PCR testing outside of public health centres, which is 
considerably earlier than the UK’s testing system.64 The effective PCR 
testing is only a small section of Japans 3-part strategy or 3 strategies; 
the first and second parts involve promoting social distancing, contact 
tracing, and surveillance under the Patient Cluster Countermeasure 
Group of the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare. All contact 
tracing was performed by the public health centres which, prior to 
PCR testing, used computed tomography (CT) scanners to investigate 
suspicious pneumonia cases. The third strategy involved addressing 
public behaviour and promoting frequent handwashing, coughing, 
and sneezing etiquette as well as prioritising healthcare for the 
elderly.65 Additionally, the citizens of Japan have a high adherence to 
the recommendations provided by the Government as a study found 
that 80% participants implemented social distancing measures along 
with the suggested behavioural changes for virus prevention i.e., 
frequent hand washing.65 Another principal factor is Japan’s border 
control which imposed travel restrictions from March 2020, which 
increased to limited access for entry into the country.66 
Similar to the UK, the Netherlands’ principles for monitoring cases 
included a contact tracing app known as Corona Melder. All cases had 
to be reported to the municipal health service with information about 
who you’ve been within 1.5 meters of for at least 15 minutes in a 
24-hour time period including the possible source and the potential 
individual who could be infected.67,68 Adherence to lockdown rules 
was low like in the UK as, according to a study by Bente and others, 
the Dutch were likely to visit their family and were less likely to wear 
a mask compared to people from Fleming although the Dutch were 
more likely to wash their hands.69 As the number of SARS-CoV-2 
cases are similar, there are more effective methods for monitoring, 
and low adherence to rules can majorly tribute to surge in SARS-
CoV-2 cases. Alternatively, the death rate is much higher in the UK 
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than it is in the Netherlands. Some factors affecting this could include 
the health of the population and number of people vulnerable to 
SARS-CoV-2 but with little evidence to prove correlation between 
state of health and SARS-CoV-2 infections a strong conclusion cannot 
be made. In relation to border control, the UK made minimal effort 
to restrict border movements and many people were able to travel 
for holidays during 2020.70 The Netherlands did close their border 
but only to countries outside of the EU, which can be problematic 
as many EU countries had large outbreaks of SARS-CoV-2 such as 
Italy.71 
Conclusion 
As demonstrated in Table 3, adherence to government 
recommendations and closure or restriction of movement across 
borders are significant factors to the number of cases of SARS-
CoV-2. These are important to consider as reducing the transmission 
of the virus will decrease the mortality caused by SARS-CoV-2. 
The effectiveness of the contact tracing system is dependent on the 
attitude of the country’s citizens and limited access of entry from 
other countries across the world. There is minimal evidence to find 
a definite cause to the UK’s high mortality rate, but the insufficient 
procedures in place and the public’s low adherence caused by losing 
trust in the government capabilities is one important aspect to the 
UK’s poorly performing Test and Trace system. Some trust was 
lost from the public from rumours of poor laboratory standards in 
lighthouse laboratories, intrusion of privacy and counterproductive 
curfews, drastically affecting the number of SARS-CoV-2 cases and 
mortalities.







virus laws and 
recommendations
Total cases of SARS-
CoV-2 (up to 10th 
February 2021)
Total deaths from SARS-
CoV-2 (up to 10th February 
2021)
UK × Low 39,72,035 1,13,832
The Netherlands × Mid to low 10,09,373 14,374
Japan √ High 4,08,084 6,610
New Zealand √ High 1,967 24
Adherence and closure of borders are not the only factors affecting 
case numbers as transmission in schools requires consideration. Each 
country had similar basic procedures such as promoting regular 
hand washing, however some countries put more policies into place. 
For example, Japan reduced the number of students in classes, 
increased the teaching staff and reduced the hours spent at school. 
Smaller groups and less time spent at school meant that there was 
a smaller transmissibility between students and staff members. New 
Zealand close schools when an individual tested positive so the 
school could be sanitised. Both Japan and New Zealand had contact 
tracing within their school environments unlike the UK which had no 
obvious requirement for contact tracing in schools. These differences 
highlight how additional policies can reduce the transmission of the 
virus and emphasises how the government has lacked in support of 
implementing a contact tracing system successfully into society. 
Hospitality sectors had some significance to the transmission of 
SARS-CoV-2. Each country has similar principles for safety such as 
the use of contact tracing systems via an app or taking contact details 
from customers. The UK, particularly when introducing curfews, 
introduced more risks due to the response of the public. After a brief 
time, the curfew in the UK was adjusted to reduce the transmission 
risk created. Japan was able to successfully introduce curfews which 
were earlier than the curfews implemented in the UK. This clearly 
demonstrates how adherence is important in contact tracing systems 
to reduce transmission. 
When comparing each countries’ contact tracing system, the 
objectives and aims are similar, however the implementation of the 
objectives varies significantly which determines the effectiveness 
of each countries monitoring system. Japan changed the public’s 
behaviour effectively unlike the UK and the Netherlands. Japan 
utilised a contact tracing system through the Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Welfare, like the NNDSS; an effective system for 
epidemiologists to collate, analyse and share data. If a system like 
the NNDSS was implemented into the UK information between 
experts, the Government and the public could have been accessed 
more rapidly. The UK’s system would be improved by introducing 
alternative contact tracing apps as offered in New Zealand or through 
a nationalised system like Japan. 
Some recommendations for this investigation include assessing 
other countries like Australia, Taiwan, USA, Canada, or any 
other European country. This is to compare the similarities and 
differences between the contact tracing systems, and strategies in 
place monitoring transmission and mortality. Another consideration 
is to investigate into pre-existing health conditions and their effect 
on mortality in relation to SARS-CoV-2, which could be possible 
when more published research is performed into these areas. When 
definite causes are known, more recommendations can be provided to 
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